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It would be possible to talk about all of this in
a more technical way, more appropriate to the
actor, as a precise task in relation to craft.
However, I always try to talk about these things
on a more general level in order to highlight the
essence in the actor’s and the director’s work,
and to question my responsibility as a human
being in this particular context. Since it is
possible, in the concrete situation of daily praxis,
to take one path just as well as another . . . I try to
take the discourse beyond questions of technique,
style, or other specific artistic choices and come
down to the level of human choices.
Ingemar Lindh1
THE PRACTICE of the Swedish theatre -
maker Ingemar Lindh (1945–1997) is often
associated with his apprenticeship and work
with Étienne Decroux in the late 1960s. But
corporeal mime constituted only the initial
phase of Lindh’s involvement in theatre. In
1971, following a series of work encounters
with Jerzy Grotowski and the setting up of
Studio II with Yves Lebreton at Eugenio
Barba’s Odin Teatret in Holstebro, Lindh
founded his own laboratory theatre in
Sweden: the Institutet för Scenkonst (Insti tute
for Scenic Art). After five years of in tense
formative work and research in northern
Sweden (1971–76), the Institute underwent a
period without a permanent base (1976–83).
The origins of the Institute’s research on the
principles of collective improvisation can be
traced to this ‘nomadic period’, which was
also very rich in performances and other
research work. In 1984, the Institute found
a home in the Teatro della Rosa (Theatre of
the Rose) in Pontremoli, Italy, where they
remained until 1997. Lindh’s death in Malta
from a cardiac arrest at the age of fifty-two
coincided with the Institute’s departure from
Pontremoli; though the two events were not
directly related, the latter weighed heavily
on his peace of mind. 
Lindh’s work on collective improvisation
has crucial implications for the history of
twentieth-century laboratory theatre in pro -
viding a unique contribution to the study of
the performer and performance process. The
ethi cal dimension that accompanies a prac -
tice of collective improvisation is also illumi -
n ating for a more holistic understanding of
246 ntq 24:3 (august 2008)  © cambridge university press  doi:10.1017/S0266464X08000304
Frank Camilleri
Hospitality and the Ethics 
of Improvisation in the Work 
of Ingemar Lindh
Ingemar Lindhʼs work on the principles of collective improvisation has crucial implications
for the history of twentieth-century laboratory theatre. His early work with Étienne Decroux
and Jerzy Grotowski contributed to the development of a unique practice that resists
directorial montage, fixed scores, and choreography; and the ethical dimension that
accompanies Lindhʼs research on collective improvisation is illuminating for a more holistic
understanding of the technical and aesthetic considerations in theatre. In this article,
Frank Camilleri discusses some of the key aspects of this dimension, notably the
dynamics of hospitality and encounter that inform Lindhʼs approach and the question of
responsibility in the actorʼs work. Frank Camilleri is Lecturer in Drama and Theatre
Studies at the University of Kent. From 2004 to 2008 he was Academic Coordinator of
Theatre Studies at the University of Malta. He is also Artistic Director of Icarus Performance
Project – an ongoing research laboratory that investigates the intermediary space between
training and performance processes. Camilleriʼs work with Lindh in the mid-1990s was
instrumental for the development of this research practice.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 12 Oct 2012 IP address: 129.12.11.80
the technical and aesthetic considerations in
theatre. In view of this objective, I shall dis -
cuss some of the key aspects in Lindh’s prac -
tice as they are informed by the dynamics of
hospitality and encounter. I shall also con -
sider the question of responsibility in the
actor’s work in an improvisatory context that
resists predetermined structures such as
direc torial montage and choreography. It is
hoped that this discussion will contribute to
the discourse of performance ethics by means
of a unique case study that is rooted in the
history and practice of twentieth-century
Euro pean research theatre. 
Lindh’s Biographical Visibility
Although the work of Lindh is known in
theatre and academic circles in Sweden and
Italy, it is mostly unknown in the English-
speaking world. Apart from certain refer -
ences in publications by Eugenio Barba,
including three sets of photographs in A
Dictionary of Theatre Anthropology, in which
Lindh illustrates exercises derived from
Decroux, very little has been published in
English about him.2 The only other ‘major’
reference that a discerning reader can detect
is in the back pages of the Black Mountain
Press series dedicated to European Contem -
porary Classics/Theatre, which have been
announcing since 1999 that Lindh’s book,
Stepping Stones, is ‘already in the process of
translation and production’.3
The status of Lindh’s bibliographical visi -
bility is in part due to the low profile that the
Institute kept throughout its history in order
to maintain its research focus on the peda -
gogy and creativity of the actor’s work.4 In
part it is also due to Lindh’s death in 1997,
which occurred at a point when transcripts
of his conference speeches began to appear
in various publications. Of particular interest
to New Theatre Quarterly readers is Lindh’s
only publication in English, ‘Gathering
Around the Word Theatre . . . ’, which in -
cludes an exchange between the late Clive
Barker and Lindh, both of whom were key -
note speakers at a Helsinki symposium in
1994.5
The diffusion of knowledge about Lindh’s
work in the mid-1990s stalled with his death
and with the Institute’s subsequent move to
Sweden. Pietre di Guado was published post -
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Ingemar Lindh in Porsgrunn (Norway),
1996. Photo: Stefano Lanzardo
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 12 Oct 2012 IP address: 129.12.11.80
hu mously in Italy in 1998 and a Swedish edi -
tion appeared in 2003. An English version of
the book is due to appear in 2010, edited and
introduced by the author of this article.
Lindh’s adoption of improvisation as a
principle of organization in performance has
proved his major contribution to twentieth-
century theatre practice. Although improv -
isation in training and in compositional
pro cesses is not new (Lindh himself had
been exposed to it in Wrocław and Holste -
bro), no one within the frame of laboratory
theatre has conducted such a rigorous and
long-term exploration of collective improvis -
ation as a principle of organization in the
performance event itself. Lindh’s formation
under Decroux had given him the technical
precision and knowledge that other theatre -
makers in the second half of the century
aspired to achieve in their investigation of
training processes and physical scores for the
actor. Lindh’s interest in improvisation was
in turn sparked by the possibilities that lie
beyond the mastery of technique:
Because I happened to end up in the cave of
Decroux, precision was given to me as a gift. And
I never felt the need to search for it any longer, it
was just there. And that, in a way, eliminated my
fear of chaos, and I started to be more and more
curious about the perfection or the organic organ -
iz ation of chaos. Because chaos is only our lack of
capacity of perceiving.6
The quality of perception and the capacity to
react to what the context as a whole suggests
in the here-and-now of occurrence lie at the
heart of Lindh’s investigation of collective
impro visation. 
The psychophysical aware ness that a
practitioner cultivates by means of a long-
term practice is underlined by Lindh’s use of
the term ‘to listen’ in the context of the im -
provising actor’s capacity to perceive and
(re)act. This kind of sensitivity marks ‘a state
of vigilance’ that is crucial to the Institute’s
research on the mechanisms and dynamics
of encounter that serve to organize the per -
formative event.7 As I argue extensively else -
where, Lindh’s innovation lies in identifying
the irreducible here-and-now aspect of ‘listen-
ing’ as the primary facilitator of encounter
within a compositional process that is also an
aesthetic and a poetics.8
In this article I shall suggest that Lindh’s
pursuit of collective improvisation as a per -
formance practice is also indicative of an
ethics that seeks to inhabit the instant of
occur rence via a sensitized consideration of
context. Since human beings are constantly
called upon to make choices and take deci -
sions, the improvising actor’s refined capa -
city to do so in the context of theatre means
that, potentially, the actor is working on the
same mechanism that is in operation in an
ethics of responsibility. 
The House Project 
The dynamics of hospitality that inform the
Institute’s ‘House Project’ will serve as the
main point of refer ence for a discussion on
the ethical dimen sion of Lindh’s work. The
concept of hospitality involved in this was
‘fundamental’ for Lindh (Pietre di Guado, p.
116). This con cept permeated the theatre prac -
tice of the Institute as well as the way in which
its mem bers ran their community within a
social con text. 
In the Institute’s history, the so-called
‘House Project’ refers to the endeavours
during its nomadic period in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, when Lindh and his per -
formers were looking for a place to serve as a
base for their practice. A similar project was
again underway in the late 1990s when the
Institute was forced to leave Pontremoli after
twelve years of residency in the Teatro della
Rosa. Lindh’s death in 1997 occurred at the
juncture when the Institute was searching for
a new home that fulfilled the needs of their
practice. His closest collaborators, and the
cur rent leaders of the Institute, Magdalena
Pietruska and Roger Rolin, proceeded in their
quest until they eventually relocated to
Sweden where they set up ‘house’ in Nygård. 
The objective of stability that the quest for
a house implied for the Institute was not so
much a geographical or a research necessity
as a practical need related to the housing of
their pedagogical work with students. The
choice of terminology to describe this need
(‘house’ rather than ‘theatre’, ‘space’ or
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‘centre’) is indicative of the nature of their
prac tice that sought to investigate the mech -
anisms of everyday life in the work of the
actor. These mechanisms were principally
concerned with ways of exploring encounter
as a vital aspect of their pedagogical practice
and collective improvisation. Lindh’s account
of the inception of the House Project in the
late 1970s makes clear the link that existed
between their theatre practice and the need
for a ‘House’ – a link that has remained a
constant throughout the Institute’s history:
Through an ongoing discussion, the outlines of
the House Project became ever clearer; what we
were looking for was an affordable building with
adequate working spaces and living quarters for
ourselves and our students. This was our sole
reference point as we were vagabonds not tied
economically to, or dependent on, any country.
Our only bond was with our work which we took
with us wherever we went. . . . We no longer
needed to move around to be nomads. The impor -
tant thing was to remain mentally mobile. Physic -
ally we could also settle down somewhere to
protect the continuity of the work. It was not
important in which country. We had always been
strangers and will always remain strangers. 
(Pietre, p. 86)
The gypsy-like existence of the Institute’s
first decade and the ability its members had
developed in making a ‘home’ out of the
little provided by everywhere is reflective of
an inner stability they were intent on cultiv -
ating and protecting as practitioners of a
‘poor theatre’ based on the work upon one -
self. Lindh observes that:
The house is not different from all the other things
that make up the life of the Institutet för Scen -
konst; everything is always based on the trust we
have in one’s lot, which means to accept its con -
sequences. . . . Of course, if someone is truly
searching one has the possibility to get what one
wants. . . . Such a search has to be part of a wider
aspiration, that is, of the work, and of what we
want to get from the work on a human level.
Obviously, all our energy, our entire aspiration tends
towards that for which we are searching. One day we
will find it. And also then it will be linked to our
way of working. (Pietre, p. 116–17; my italics)
Typically of his holistic approach, Lindh here
links a number of issues that can only be sep -
ar ated on a theoretical level. These include a
world view that forms the basis of an ethics
and a central tenet in his practice, namely,
the mental act marked by intention as a
‘tending towards’ the performance of action.
Before discussing the matter of intention, I
shall expand on Lindh’s outlook as under -
scored by the ‘trust’ and ‘acceptance’ of ‘one’s
lot’ since this has important implications for
an understanding of the ethics embedded in
his practice. 
Trust and Acceptance 
Lindh’s ‘trust in one’s lot’ marks a crucial
intersection in highlighting an ethos that per -
vades both the modus vivendi and the modus
operandi of the Institute. The problematics of
translation that concern the word ‘lot’ shed
light on the attitude that animates Lindh’s
practice. The Italian word sorte that Lindh
employs in Pietre di Guado, whose meaning
overlaps with ‘fate’ and ‘destiny’, is only an
indicative equivalent of Lindh’s original
Swedish word slump, which again problem -
atically translates as ‘chance’ and ‘luck’. But
Lindh’s reference to slump and sorte does not
imply a passive acceptance that predeter -
mined ‘fate’ and ‘destiny’, or capricious ‘luck’
and ‘chance’, entail. When Pietruska was
work ing on the English translation it was not
possible to render Lindh’s formulation as
‘trust in one’s luck’. The neutral status of ‘lot’
was considered to fit better within the frame
of Lindh’s philosophy.9 ‘Lot’ is a neutral
word that refers to one’s condition on earth,
a situation that is neither sought nor antici -
pated, but whose potential can be exposed
and fulfilled by one’s actions.
It is precisely the awareness of the possi -
bilities and limits of ‘one’s lot’ that sustains
Lindh’s practice in life and in the theatre. In
fact, one of Lindh’s key terms in the Insti -
tute’s research on collective improvisation is
‘social situation’ which refers to ‘all that is
outside of the actor’ in training and perfor m -
ance contexts, including colleagues, the space,
objects, sounds, textures, costumes, music,
and text (Pietre, p. 68). The trust in one’s
condition that charac terized the Institute’s
quest for a House thus finds resonance in
Lindh’s investigation of collective impro -
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visation by way of attention to the social
situation. 
The actor’s ability to ‘listen’ to what is
happening within and around oneself can be
described as a form of psychophysical aware -
ness that makes it possible to inhabit the
event in the here-and-now of occurrence by
way of considering the various components
present within a context. It is this consider -
ation, which is not found in the predeter -
mined mechanisms of either fixed scores or
choreography, that makes space for the
unpredictable and unaccountable to occur
during improvisation. The possibility of con -
tingency that exists in life and which Lindh
sought to explore in performance can be
identified as a condition of the improvising
actor’s capacity to be adequate to a given
situation:
We never abandoned ourselves to our lot. . . . On
the contrary, every human creative process neces -
sarily has to be active. During the work, for
instance, we refer to listening as the most impor -
tant element. Often we talk of active passivity, or
passive activity, which is something so difficult to
obtain, even in a small gesture [since] any gesture
must always tend towards something and must
give space for one’s aspirations to flow freely. So,
it is not a matter of abandoning oneself to one’s
lot, but rather a matter of not negating the lot.
(Pietre, p. 118)
The active-passivity/passive-activity pheno -
menon invoked here is reminiscent of the
Institute’s work on ‘mobile immobility’ that
Lindh had received from Decroux.10 This kind
of immobility refers to a technical and physi -
o logical condition in which the practitioner
performs an action even if there is a lack of
movement. Decroux’s approach was to exe -
cute the smallest possible movements until
one is able to master even the tiniest one in
its most minute detail, until immobility be -
comes the ultimate consequence of minimiz -
ation in space and time. The nature of this
kind of immobility is dynamic and active.
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Ingemar Lindh in the mime study L’Oiseau et Le Chasseur, at Teatro Laboratorio del G.A.S. (La Spezia, Italy),
1984. Photo: Stefano Lanzardo
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 12 Oct 2012 IP address: 129.12.11.80
The implications of this form of taking action,
which constituted one of the funda mental
aspects of Lindh’s work with Eugenio Barba’s
ISTA, will be discussed later in this article.11
Intention and ‘Mental Precision’ 
The other aspect that Lindh’s prioritizing of
‘trust in one’s lot’ brings to the fore is the
question of intention or the role played by
the mind in the implementation of action.
‘Mental precision’ is a phrase that occupies a
specific place in the Institute’s jargon on the
phenomenon of intention: it indicates the
movement in the mind that precedes the
physi cal manifestation of action.
It is impor tant to qualify that mental
precision in the Institute’s context does not in
any way imply a preponderance of mind over
body. The status of action-in-the-mind that is
implied by ‘mental precision’ and ‘intention’
is indeed that of physical action. This pheno -
menon will be discussed in greater detail in
the context of the Institute’s work on the
‘disinterested act’, but for now it will be suf -
ficient to observe the terminological space
that it shares with Lindh’s concept of ‘trust in
one’s lot’. 
We have already seen how Lindh con -
siders the quest announced by the House
Project as ‘not different from all the other
things’ that make up the life of the Institute.
Further: 
Such a search has to be part of a wider aspiration,
that is, of the work, and of what we want to get
from the work on a human level. Obviously, all
our energy, our entire aspiration tends towards that
for which we are searching. One day we will find it.
And also then it will be linked to our way of
work ing. (Pietre, p. 116–17, my italics)
Lindh’s account of the Institute’s ‘entire aspi -
r ation’ is reminiscent of the terminological
dynamics that characterize intention in his
work. Pietruska observes that ‘intention’ com-
bines two meanings in the Institute’s work:
‘to tend forward’ and ‘tension’. The first
meaning relates to a mental inclination to do
something, the second to its physical mani -
fes tation as the mobilization of one’s energy
in a specific direction.12
The ‘tending towards’ dynamics of the
Institute’s ‘entire aspiration’ thus overlaps
with the first meaning indicated by Pietruska
since both terms look forward to something
yet to be achieved and the first step to
achieve this is an inclination to do it. The
second meaning Pietruska enumerates (that
is, intention as the mobilization of one’s
energy) highlights the physical quality of the
inclination, whether it is an action in perfor -
mance or the acquisition of a house in life.
The two meanings that permeate the Insti -
tute’s use of ‘intention’ have far-reaching
implications for a political and ethical dis -
course vis-à-vis decision and action. If the
Institute’s inclination for action is based on
an acceptance of their situation that involves
an understanding of their condition as a
point of departure, and if their way of oper a -
tion is not to force predetermined judge -
ments (fixed scores or choreography) but to
‘listen’ and to adapt to the here-and-now of
occurrence, then the political and ethical
dimension of their research practice assumes
wider implications. 
The rest of this article will endeavour to
explicate these implications by way of a sen -
sitized appreciation of the Other, since the
practice of ‘listening’ and accepting one’s lot
is always already informed by a special
relationship with the Other. The role played
by the Other in the Institute’s modus vivendi
and modus operandi is manifested in Lindh’s
practice of encounter, which is once again
evident in the House Project. 
Hospitality, Encounter, and the Other
Besides adequate working spaces, ‘a corner for
an office’, and living quarters for the mem -
bers of the Institute, an essential requirement
of the House Project included accommo -
dation space for students and guests (Pietre,
p. 117). The Insti tute’s guests were (and still
are) usually fellow artists and researchers.13
Lindh’s views on the host ing of guests entail
a practice of encounter which has a number
of cultural and ethical considerations: 
We always try to encounter the foundations of
our culture. If you go to a monastery, there will
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always be a place to sleep, even if you do not have
a penny. We search . . . not an ideology, because we
have never searched for, or practised, an ideology;
instead we look for a possibility to see each other,
to encounter the others, to encounter the world, to
encounter the working space, to encounter. As I
have said before, the prime condi tion for working
in a group is to have the capacity of being on your
own – so as not to become a burden on the others.
This is the principle of collaboration on the ‘floor’
during improvis a tions; it is also the basic principle of
hospi tality with regard to both guests and stu dents.
It must be a reciprocal attitude, for other wise one
ends up imposing on, rather than encountering,
the other. (Pietre, p. 123, my italics) 
Lindh’s reference to ‘the basic principle of
hospitality’ in the collaborative context of col -
lective improvisation occupies an impor tant
place in a discussion of the ethical dimen sion
of the Institute’s work. Hospitality is a re -
current theme in Paolo Martini’s interview
with Lindh in Pietre di Guado (p. 115–55) and
this quotation serves to establish the prin -
cipal co-ordinates it occupies in Lindh’s
practice. 
The mechanics of encounter and the sen si -
tivity to the Other that permeate hospitality
are manifested in various aspects of the Insti -
tute’s raison d’être, including: the performer’s
work upon oneself; the relationship with
space and text; the role of the spectator; and
the discipline of the work. In the following
paragraphs and sections I will discuss these
aspects in a context suggested by Lindh him -
self – the resistance to ideology. I will argue
that the Institute’s resistance to ideology
adopts the dynamics of an ethics in pursuing
a modus operandi that seeks to inhabit and
negotiate the exigencies of the here-and-now
by means of the capacity to listen to the
Other and to act upon that basis. 
The always already-in-progress status of a
practice that resists predetermined formulae
renders it an ‘impossible’ ethics in that it has
to be formulated at each and every moment
and for each and every occasion. The point of
reference that enables such an ethics is not so
much a discipline or a technique as a capa -
city for and a way of inhabiting that disci -
pline. This is reminiscent of the ‘impossible’
dynamics of active-passivity as well as of the
Institute’s stable geographical location while
at the same time remaining nomadic in spirit
and ‘mentally mobile’ (Pietre, p. 86). 
The ‘basic principle of hospitality’ to
which Lindh alludes is primarily a way of
life. Allowing for the Althusserian consider -
ation that we are always already within ideo -
logy, hospitality for the Institute is not an
ideological pursuit in that it eschews a prac -
tice predetermined by a set of concepts. It is,
rather, a practice of encounter that gives birth
to what can be described as an ethics that is
always ‘in progress’ in being alert to context.
The practice of encounter pervades the very
fibre of the Institute’s way of life and doing,
at the heart of which is the actor’s work. 
Space as an ‘Other’
In the studio space, the actor’s capacity for
being on one’s own during collective impro -
visation is tantamount to encountering one -
self as Other. The codified and empirical
types of training processes that the Institute
developed in the course of its history are
representative of the actor’s capacity to work
upon oneself as Other, which Lindh iden -
tifies as essential for collective improvis -
ation.14 During collective improvisation, the
ability to listen to the Other in the here-and-
now of a ‘social situation’ comes to the fore
in marking the prime condition of encounter.
The ‘collective’ element in an improvisation
indeed refers to the negotiation of encoun -
ters that occurs at the possibilities suggested
by listening. 
The practice of encounter is also evident
in Lindh’s outlook on space. The House Pro -
ject itself, with its spaces reserved for students
and guests, is one living manifestation of a
practice geared towards encountering others.
Closer to the core of theatrical practice is the
way the Institute’s practitioners deal with the
studio space as an ‘other’ with its own speci -
fic characteristics: 
First you conceive a performance at home in your
working space, and bit by bit the space becomes
nearly ideal and ends up married to the work.
When you go on tour, of course, you never find a
space which is similar, let alone identical. So, you
have to adapt yourself. One alternative is to . . .
recreate conditions which come as close as pos -
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sible to those of the working space you left behind
at home; but in this case you run the risk of going
against the new space. The other alternative is to
accept that which the new space can give you and
to try to encounter it in the shortest time possible,
adapting the performance to that space. This is
especially important when the space, or the house
in question, already has a distinct character, a life.
(Pietre, p. 119–20)
The adjustment to the architectural proper -
ties of a space here described amounts to an
endeavour to encounter that is not based on
preconceived formulations but, rather, on a
process of familiarization and mutual infor -
m ation. The same can be said of the manner
in which text is approached: 
There you are like David in front of Goliath, think -
ing: ‘I am so small and insignificant, how can I
encounter this monster of a text as an equal?’ And
you begin to construct your ‘armour’, in the fun -
da mental sense of ‘encounter’, just like in martial
arts. How can I construct an instrument, a tool, to
read the dynamic of the other?15 
Although this attitude towards space and
text is not uniquely the Institute’s and is app -
licable to most performing arts practices, the
place that it occupies in Lindh’s framework
of encounter bestows upon it an ethical
quali ty that is only rarely to be found. 
Witness-as-Guest
The ethical status of the Institute’s practice of
hospitality is also discernible in Lindh’s views
on the role of the audience. In addition to stu -
dents, fellow artists, and researchers, Lindh
includes spectators in the spectrum of en -
coun ter as ‘guests [who] come to see what
you are doing, to participate’ (Pietre, p. 124).
Lindh’s vision of the spectator as ‘witness’ is
reminiscent of Grotowski – but the emphasis
on the witness-as-guest is, I believe, his own.16
Lindh’s work exchanges with the Polish
master at the turn of the 1970s and the
subsequent knowledge of Grotowski’s work
must have left a mark, as is evident in enun -
ciations such as this:
You do not ask the audience to consume a per -
formance, but you ask them to actively participate
in it through the role of witness. The main thing is
that the roles are clearly defined: as an actor, I
have a task to carry out, as the audience, you have
another one, and everyone has to carry out their
task with all their creativity and all the means at
their disposal. For the spectator it is a matter of
actively observing and listening. (Pietre, p. 124)
Lindh’s specific take on this position is, sig -
ni fic antly, the underlining of ‘listening’ and
the active/passive axis implicit in ‘act ively
observing’. His conception of the spectator is
also in line with his belief in the acceptance
of one’s lot. 
While Lindh asserts that the roles of the
actor and the spectator are ‘clearly defined’
and separate, the ethical dimension of his
insistence on listening can be more radical
than that of a theatre, where the line between
actor and spectator is blurred at the expense
of commitment, engagement, and responsi -
bility. Revealingly, it is in the context of the
spectator-as-guest that Lindh locates ‘the
political act of our theatre’, which is ‘to ask a
human being, a citizen, to be responsible for
one’s choices, one’s tasks, and their fulfil ment;
all of that, of course, in the perform ance
space and during the performance’ (Pietre, p.
152). Forcing spectators to do something that
is against their inclinations, or trying to push
a ‘mes sage’ regardless of the context, does
not fall within the practice of the Institute,
otherwise: 
It would be a speculation on the guest; that is, you
would have already started to go down the path
of indoctrinating the other person, and so, impos -
ing your understanding of the world, in which
case you are into demagogy instead of a perform -
ance. The spectator must maintain the highest
possible degree of freedom in order to be capable
of perceiving what is taking place. (Pietre, p. 125)
This attitude also informs the hospitality that
frames the actual performance event since
for the Institute the spectator is not simply
‘viewed’ as a guest but ‘treated’ as one:
We welcome the people, we are with them before
or after the performance, and we offer some
things – a coffee, a glass of wine, something to eat.
The important thing is not to force guests, if they
do not feel like it, to speak of what they have seen.
So, it is just a matter of being with guests. 
(Pietre, p. 152)
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In this context, the Institute’s ethical dimen -
sion informs the aesthetics of their perform -
ances in the process of shaping the encounter
between performer and spectator. 
Discipline
Lindh’s reference to the monastic practice of
hospitality (Pietre, p. 123) sheds further light
on the ethics at work in the Institute. Though
the Institute is a secular entity, it is possible
to trace affinities with monasticism in terms
of practice and organization. Emmanuel
Levinas’s description of the original ethical
relationship as ‘religious’ in constituting a
‘face-to-face’ with the absolute Other finds
resonance in Lindh’s views on encounter
and hospitality.17 The isolation of medieval
monasteries was aimed at engendering the
capacity to listen to God as Other by means
of a disciplined life of work and prayer. And
a similar paradigm can be found in the
House Project of the Institute and in other
twentieth-century laboratories such as Jacques
Copeau’s Théâtre du Vieux-Colombier and
Jerzy Grotowski’s last phase in Pontedera. 
The crucial difference between Lindh and
other theatremakers is the question of hos -
pitality: the Institute’s capacity for housing
guests was, like a monastery’s, an integral
part of the praxis, and reflective of the in clin -
ation to encounter others in the hosting of
students, colleagues, and visitors. In a draft
essay originally intended as an introduction
to Pietre di Guado, Fabrizio Cruciani juxta -
poses (and thereby locates by association)
Lindh’s practice with the research endeavour
that characterized twentieth-century theatre
masters such as ‘Appia or Craig, Stanislavski
or Copeau, Meyerhold or Dullin, Brecht or
Artaud, Grotowski or Barba’.18
Within this context, Cruciani comments
on the ethical and pedagogical dimensions of
these practices: ‘The history of twentieth-
century theatre is the history of people
[uomini] who find their fulfilment in the set -
ting up of groups, of micro-societies which
live the utopia of an ethical project in the
arts’.19 Cruciani’s use of the term ‘utopia’
marks a vision as well as a practice aimed at
the holistic formation of the actor as a human
being. Lindh’s views on hospitality in the
House Project are testimony to the pheno -
menon marked by Cruciani.
The ascetic poverty of monastic practice
is, moreover, reminiscent of the minimalism
of the ‘poor theatre’ that characterized most
twentieth-century laboratories whose interest
in pursuing the irreducible elements of
theatre often led to an inner journey of self-
discovery. In this context the practice of a
‘poor theatre’ can be seen as an ethics as
much as an aesthetics. The discipline that char-
acterized the research on the fundamental
principles of these theatre laboratories was not
a prescribed formula, but a path that made
possible a structured exploration aimed at
better fulfilling the potential of being human
by the overcoming of psychophysical blocks.
Lindh’s choice of metaphor in this regard is
revealing when he resorts to another religi -
ous source:
A discipline cannot be something automatic. Like
the Mother Superior says in the Dialogues des
Carmelites by G. Bernanos: ‘It is not the rule that
protects us; it is we who protect the rule,’ other -
wise it would stop being a rule and would turn
into regulations. (Pietre, p. 127)
The knowledge embedded in a rule or a tech -
nique is not expected to be absolute in a way
that fosters passive acceptance. The ground -
breaking practice of Lindh and of other
theatre-makers in the twentieth century, in
part due to their pioneering role, bears wit -
ness to this attitude. For one common danger
faced by most contemporary research prac -
tices is to transform a specific technique into
a neatly packaged system that places one in a
position of already knowing where the point
of arrival lies before one actually departs. In
such cases it is possible to argue that the
practice is in the grips of an ideological mech -
anism as distinct from an ethical framework,
where the end result is prescribed rather
than open to the exigencies of research and
discovery. 
Most of today’s theatre practices have un -
disputed technical mastery due to the know -
ledge accrued from a century of laboratory
practice, and so can focus on what is ‘known’.
But this sophisticated technique is rarely
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accom panied by a cultivated ethical dimen -
sion which includes the inclination to move
beyond the strictures of the known that had
initially given birth to a particular technique
in an isolated and ‘poor’ laboratory. Neatly
packaged in drama school curricula, univer -
sity modules, and short-term workshops, it
is now possible to study biomechanics,
Grotowski-based work, yoga, and so on. The
fundamental lack inherent in such a com -
modified approach is that of an ethical modus
vivendi and modus operandi. In this context
it is very difficult to make a choice and be
responsible for that action because all deci -
sions have already been made for you. 
Responsibility
The picture that emerges from this discus -
sion corroborates the claim that an ethical
dimension informs the practice of the Insti -
tute under Lindh’s guidance. The space that
this ethics shares with the research on the
principles of collective improvisation predic -
ates an ‘impossible’ situation where each and
every aspect of context is potentially capable
of influencing the initiation, nature, and out -
come of encountering the Other. 
The ethical implications of such a practice
contribute to a state where the performer’s
actions are determined by a capacity to listen
to and inhabit the event according to its
constituent elements. In this scenario, the
performer as decision-taker and action-doer
is called upon to be accountable on the basis
of an ethics that impossibly seeks to be
(re)created in the here-and-now of occur -
rence. Previous contexts, prior decisions, and
past actions do not function as predeter -
mined rules, but rather serve to sensitize the
performer’s capacity to listen, in the process
contributing towards a fuller realization of
the human being’s potential. The ‘impos -
sible’ ethical accountability that epitomizes
Lindh’s conception of the improvising per -
former is reflected in his discourse on the
responsibility of action. 
Responsibility is a major issue in Lindh’s
perspective on theatre, which for him is an
integral reflection of life. As human beings,
we are constantly called upon to make choices
and the decisions that we take are the actions
we perform. In this sense the actor is in a pri -
vileged position to reflect our being human
precisely because of the imperative to act. In
Lindh’s view, the actor’s capacity to take
action engenders the capacity to decide and
make choices, which means that, poten tially,
the actor is working on the same mech anism
that is in operation in an ethics of res pon -
sibility. Of course, responsibility for one’s
actions is not specific to the actor, and the
privileged position Lindh confers on the actor
is set within a wider ethical discourse. Res -
ponsibility for one’s actions
is something specific to the actor only in as much
as he or she is privileged. Since the actor has the
possibility to create one’s own laboratory, as evi -
denced by one’s personal daily work and the cre -
ation of performances, the art of the actor is not
subjected to moral laws. I think that the choice of
becoming an actor, just like any other choice, is
already and always a moral question. But once
that choice has been made, and once its conse qu -
ences have been taken, there is something amoral,
not immoral, which is conceded to art. This choice
does not directly involve our ethical conscience
because it is not a social act which knowingly
risks hurting someone else. Apart from that, I
think that moral responsibility is included in all
choices, and it should be equally binding for all
human beings. But art is the exception as it is a
manifestation only of itself, and even more so the
art of the actor which is a human being expressing
a human being through a human being. It is the
only art which has these characteristics. 
(Pietre, p. 136) 
The impossible quality of Lindh’s practice
once again comes to the fore and implies a
chal lenging process that is always at the
limits of one’s abilities and capacity; as such,
it also marks the initial impulse of ‘avant-
garde’ and ‘cutting edge’ which is always at
the forefront, negotiating the possible on the
verge of the impossible. 
The moral dimen sion of the actor’s labo -
ra tory work as envis aged by Lindh is impos -
sible because it marks an ‘ethics’ that is not
an ethics in being ‘amoral’. Although the act
of becoming an actor is always a moral issue
(in as much as all choices are invested with
responsibility), the passage that this decision
entails for Lindh is to a dimension (that is,
theatre) whose self-reflective dynamics and
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mechanisms liberate the actor from an ethics
that applies in everyday life. 
The impossible status of this liberated
ethics and morality can be called ‘originary’
or ‘in progress’ in that the actor is called
upon to decide and act in the here-and-now
of occurrence, where precedents do not exist
or are not binding (as they might be in a
court of law); no pre scribed set of rules can
be adequate enough because every situation
is impossibly origin ary in never being an
exact replica of another. Lindh’s vision of art
and theatre is filtered through his research on
the improvising actor whose reference points
are not directorial montage or choreography
but the ability to construct paths of action
according to what one ‘listens’ to in a
situation.
For Lindh, it is vital that the artist takes on
the responsibility of his or her work. In this
case, responsibility is not so much concerned
with the status of what or how something
is presented but with the nature of the com -
mitment that characterizes the process and
presentation of that endeavour. The nature of
this commitment has to be total on all levels,
including the matter of content, about which
Lindh argues there are two available options:
You [as artist] can consider the message as some -
thing superficial, something manufactured for the
use and consumption of others, or you can con -
sider it as something you have created for your -
self and for which you assume the responsibility.
I think that this [latter] act has to shine through a
work of art. I believe that when we . . . feel some -
thing repulsive or not convincing in a so-called
‘work of art’, this is because we feel the absence of
responsibility. But if the artist totally takes on
what he or she presents, this act of responsibility
is also part of the message. (Pietre, p. 137)
The ethical dimension of Lindh’s theatre prac-
tice involves a scenario where human beings,
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irrespective of their role or function, are
called upon to be decisive, take action, and
be responsible in a context of encounter that
is open to the Other.
The Disinterested Act
The specific status that marks the Institute’s
practice and ethics is crystallized in one of
Lindh’s major research endeavours before
his death. His work with actor Roger Rolin
on ‘the disinterested act’ during the process
that led to the solo performance Popolo was
part of the Institute’s ongoing research on
intention. The ‘disinterested act’ purports to
push the limits of the work on mental pre -
cision by attempting to accomplish action
(which is always an act of responsibility)
irrespective of the psychological need for it.
The objective of this technical aspiration is to
tap into a form of awareness that is percep -
tible only on a more profound level than that
filtered by psychological mechanisms. The
nature of that perception is as much the
responsibility of the theatre-maker as it is of
the witness.
The ethical implications of a practice that
strives to accomplish an act despite the doer
are far-reaching. It is necessary to quote
Lindh in full on the matter:
Responsibility is inherent in the moment of choos -
ing to do something, and so, there is also respon -
sibility in every detail of theatrical creation. . . .
The disinterested act has no connotations of irres -
ponsibility. I proposed this term because in the
creative process the passage from spirit [anima] to
action occurs via the psyche that receives signals
to which we react. It is very difficult for us in the
twentieth century to consider the psyche without
considering also psychology, which is probably
concerned both with (1) the subjective interpre -
tation of the psyche and (2) its pathological side.
I have proposed the ‘disinterested act’ in order to
eliminate the difference between, on one hand, a
psychological interpretation and, on the other, the act
of listening to the psyche itself. In this case you do
not start from a psychological need, a desire, in
order to accomplish an act, but you reach the will
[volontà] in avoidance of wanting, and like that an
act is accomplished despite yourself. Therefore
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you search for a sort of trust, or rather, you trust in
the fact that . . . it is possible to wrestle something
more profound from your awareness, which goes
so far as to touch your consciousness. . . . This re -
quires a commitment of the actor’s entire organ -
ism and it requires one to be absolutely ‘open’
[disposto]; therefore one is responsible and through
the act, by taking action, one succeeds to give
space to something which is not known to him or
her, but is recognizable because of its authenticity.
(Pietre, p. 153–4; my italics)
The circumvention of psychological mechan -
isms (such as desire, need, and motivation)
that the ‘disinterested act’ aspires to fulfil in
the performance of action indicates an im pos-
sible ethics of ‘pure’ or ‘extreme’ selfless ness
where choices are made and responsibility
assumed irrespective of oneself.20
The con ditions of possibility that Lindh
mentions in the context of the disinterested
act are all marked by an active engagement
of one’s human capacities, including: ‘trust’
(an extension of the trust in one’s lot), ‘total
commitment’ (a result of the precision and
the dedication implied by long-term disci -
plined practice), and ‘openness’ (a state of
readiness to receive and react to any aspect
of a social situation). The ethical position
implied by the concession of space to ‘some -
thing which is not known’ marks allegi ance
to the here-and-now dynamics of occurrence
that resists predetermined judgement. The
‘not known’ is always ‘not determined’ and,
as such, necessitates a form of encounter and
an ethics that is not based on regulations but
on a capacity to listen (to ‘something more
profound’ than ‘personal needs’). The ‘auth -
en ticity’ required by Lindh refers to the com -
mitted quality and the status of something as
much as to the conditions that brought that
something about. And it is this authenticity,
this total engagement with one’s task, which
provides a work with its ethical content.
A useful way to describe the basis of the
dis interested act would be the active-passi -
vity/ passive-activity coordinates marked by
the tension inherent in ‘active immobility’.
That is, just as the disinterested act seeks to
effect action without a psychological mech -
an ism that obfuscates its path and flow,
active immobility seeks (internal) motion
irres pective of (external) movement. 
In Rolin’s performances of Popolo in Malta
in 1995 and 1996, I was struck by a specific
aspect which I came to associate with the
work on the disinterested act. This specific
element of the actor’s performance was per -
ceptible on an organic level and can only be
described in terms of dynamics and textures.
I am referring to the way the actor ‘inhab -
ited’ his actions. Rolin’s performance was
made up of sequences of actions, all linked
by a constant flow of energy, but the actions
themselves were characterized by what I can
only term a sense of ‘an action that is with -
held’. The actor was performing a ‘holding
back’ or a ‘keeping back’ that was, para -
doxically (‘despite himself’) propelling him
forward. 
It was as if Rolin’s source of energy derived
from the retention of that same energy. The
nature of that retention demanded a focused
organization of energy that the actor seemed
to be channelling into the material that con -
stituted Popolo. Technically speaking, it is
possible to trace the genealogy of this pheno -
menon to the Institute’s work on Decroux’s
mime, Tai Chi, and the empirical modes of
training, but the concept marked by the
‘disinterested act’ and its manifestation in
performance is unique to the research of the
Institute. 
Conclusion
An analysis of Ingemar Lindh’s investigation
of collective improvisation leads to a recog -
nition that it is indivisible from an ethics of
hospitality and encounter. The manner of
engagement evinced by the Institute’s prac -
tice of encountering otherness creates a
challenging rapport that demands to be
developed according to the here-and-now
exi gencies of occurrence. Since no two occur -
rences are ever the same and since the layers
of relating to an event are potentially infinite,
the co-ordinates that allow Lindh’s vision and
practice of improvisation are processual and
experiential. 
It is, then, the status of the performer’s
capacity to inhabit the event as the locus of
difference and otherness that recalls outlooks
associated with ethics. In the case of the Insti -
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tute, therefore, it is not accurate to speak of a
‘practice’ and an ‘ethics’ as if these were
distinct things – not even as two sides of the
same coin, because of the permeation that
characterizes the two. It is better to refer to
‘dimensions of practice’ that include the tech-
nique and craft associated with laboratory
theatre, the social aspect announced by the
House Project, and, finally, the way of doing
or ethics that mutually informs the other
dimensions of the Institute’s practice. 
Notes and References
1. Ingemar Lindh, Pietre di Guado (Pontedera: Ban -
decchi and Vivaldi, 1998), p. 142. All quotations from
Pietre di Guado (Stepping Stones) are based on the
unpublished English translation by Benno Plassmann,
Marlene Schranz, and Lindh’s close collaborator Mag -
dalena Pietruska. Page references to this book are given
in the text. All other translations from Italian sources
into English are by the present author.
2. Eugenio Barba and Nicola Savarese, A Dictionary
of Theatre Anthropology: the Secret Art of the Performer,
second ed., trans. Richard Fowler (London: Routledge,
2006), p. 94–5, 204–5.
3. For example, Eugenio Barba, Land of Ashes and
Diamonds (Aberystwyth: Black Mountain Press, 1999)
and Krysztof Plesniarowicz, The Dead Memory Machine:
Tadeusz Kantor’s Theatre of Death (Aberystwyth: Black
Mountain Press, 2004).
4. Marco De Marinis’s book on mime and theatre in
the twentieth century, Mimo e Teatro nel Novecento (Flor -
ence: La Casa Usher, 1993), provides some insight into
Lindh’s relative lack of bibliographical exposure when
he distinguishes between the intentional isolation of
Lindh’s ‘pedagogical and creative project’ and Yves
Lebreton’s ‘sense of the public’ and ability to promote
his work (p. 298). In this book De Marinis includes
various references to Lindh as a source on Decroux.
5. Ingemar Lindh, ‘Gathering Around the Word
Theatre . . . ’, in Pentti Paavolainen and Anu Ala-
Korpela, ed., Knowledge is a Matter of Doing (Helsinki:
Acta Scenica, 1995), p. 58–80.
6. Ibid., p. 67.
7. Cf. Lindh, Pietre di Guado, op. cit., p. 57–8.
8. Frank Camilleri, ‘Collective Improvisation: the
Prac tice and Vision of Ingemar Lindh’, The Drama Review,
forthcoming, Winter 2008.
9 . Magdalena Pietruska, in correspondence with the
author, 2008.
10. Cf. De Marinis, Mimo e Teatro, op. cit., p. 167–8.
11. Cf. Barba and Savarese, The Secret Art, op. cit.,
p. 93.
12. Pietruska, in correspondence with the author
(2007), elaborates: ‘Intention in our work terminology
indicates this small movement of mind that is at the
beginning of every act and indicates an act’s mental
direction. In life we are always acting out of intention.
Intention can be conscious or not, and it does not need to
be manifested through the movement of the body in
space.’ I discuss this aspect in greater detail in ‘The Prac -
tice and Vision of Ingemar Lindh’, op. cit.
13. The requisite condition of guest space in the
House Project is also indicative of the Institute’s peda go -
gi cal ethos. The months-long residences that the Insti -
tute organized, coupled with the fact that members
worked on performance structures with and alongside
their students, present a rare instance that links peda -
gogy with the core research endeavour of a high-calibre
laboratory practice. 
14. The distinction between the Institute’s forms of
training is not so much the type of training per se as the
way of relating to the work. ‘Academic’ training refers
to codified techniques that are already set and pre -
scribed (for example, corporeal mime and Kung Fu);
‘empirical’ training is aimed at what to do rather than how
to do (for example, the isometric-based tasks developed
by Lindh and his performers). For a detailed account of
the Institute’s various training processes, see Frank
Camilleri, ‘“To Push the Actor-Training to Its Extreme”:
Training Process in Ingemar Lindh’s Practice of Collec-
tive Improvisation’, Contemporary Theatre Review, forth -
coming, November 2008.
15. Ingemar Lindh, ‘Incontrare lo Sconosciuto’, in
Vito Minoia, ed., Se All’Università si Sperimenta il Teatro
(Pesaro: Magma, 1998), p. 57.
16 . The links and differences between the practices
of Lindh and Grotowski will be discussed in a separate
article currently in preparation. 
17. See, for example, Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and
Infinity: an Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis
(Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1969),
p. 80–1.
18. Fabrizio Cruciani, Registi Pedagoghi e Comunità
Teatrali nel Novecento, revised ed. (Rome: Editori and
Asso ciati, 1995), p. 236.
19. Ibid., p. 239.
20. Lindh acknowledges that, on a deeper level,
there is always a personal motivation in whatever we do,
even in disinterested acts, but he argues that ‘most of the
time, we act without being aware of the personal moti va-
tion’ (‘Gathering Around the Word Theatre’, op. cit., p. 77).
259
